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CASE COMMENTS

Contracts § 299 (1938). In viewing the Hill case and the principal
case together and recognizing that in the latter there was a specified
date of performance, that being the happening of an uncertain event,
then by analogy, it may be said that the Hill case would stand for the
proposition that if a date for performance is specified, there is no
ground to interpret the contract as calling for performance "within
a reasonable time," and if the other requisites are present, the rule
against perpetuities should be applicable.
The conclusion in the principal case that the covenant was not
within the rule against perpetuities can be justified if the covenant can
be construed as extending only to the immediate grantee. However,
from the record of the case it seems clear that as the interest was
"conveyable, .... vendable," and "alienable," the heirs and assigns of
the parties were bound. If the covenant was personal as between the
parties then the -ruleagainst perpetuities would clearly 'be inapplicable
but as the point is thus presented this contention would hardly be
tenable.
Perhaps when the question is again presented to the court, it
will once more declare the contract valid as not 'being obnoxious to
the rule. But, it seems that to have a right to have specific performance of a contract to convey an interest in land on the happening of
an uncertain event, is to have a property interest in the land, which
is remote and thus subject to the rule against perpetuities, and if such
contract is to be upheld as not being obnoxious to the rule, it must
'be upheld on such a basis as previously suggested and not on the
ground that the interest created is "conveyable," "vendable," and
"alienable," and 'hence not in violation of the rule against perpetuities.
Herbert Shelton Sanger, Jr.

Torts-Prenatal Injuries-Child's Right to Recover
As a result of an automobile collision, a passenger in vehicle
A gave birth prematurely -toa child, who lived only four hours. The
child's representative brought actions against the driver of vehicle B
to recover damages for pain and agony suffered by the child, who
was 'assumed to 'be viable, and for her allegedly wrongful death. Held,
affirmed. A foetus which has reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother
is a person. If such a child is injured, it is entitled, after its birth,
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to receive damages for pain and agony suffered, and if death ensues,
its personal representative is entitled to damages for its wrongful
death. Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E. 2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
The holding in the principal case is consistent with the more
liberal and realistic approach that many courts have recently taken
with regard to recovery for prenatal injuries. This decision tends to
promote further the departure from the rigidity of the more orthodox
view which denied recovery. It now appears that the view allowing
recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant is supported by the
numerical weight of authority in the United States. Wendt v. Lillo,
182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960). However, prior to the last
decade, the majority of jurisdictions denied recovery in an action for
prenatal injuries. The principal reasons advanced in support of the
rule denying recovery were as follows: (1) lack of precedent in
that no case permitted recovery, Alhalre v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184
Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); (2) the difficulty in determining
whether the prenatal injury actually caused the death or deformed
condition of the child, Stanford v. St. Louis-San FranciscoRy. Co.,
214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); (3) the unborn child is a part
of its mother: hence no separate duty is owing to it, Dietrich v.
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); and (4) permitting recovery
might give rise to fictitious claims, Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
The case most commonly cited as authority for the rule denying
recovery for prenatal injuries isDietrich v. Northampton, supra, which
appears to be the first case wherein the question was considered.
In that case a woman four or five months advanced in pregnancy, by
reason of a fall upon a defective highway, prematurely gave birth to
a child. The child was unable to survive more than ten or fifteen
minutes. It was held that the child was not a "person," and recovery
was denied.
In the case of Alhaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., supra, it was held
that an infant has not before birth such an independent existence to
enable him to sustain an action for prenatal injuries. In Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), D negligently permitted
a coalhole in the sidewalk in front of his premises to remain uncovered. P's mother fell into it. P, as yet unborn, sustained injuries.
Born eleven days after the accident, an action was brought by P's
guardian ad litem. The court held that a child has no right of action
for injury negligently inflicted upon it while it was in its mother's
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womb. Subsequent cases following the view denying recovery for
prenatal injuries are annotated in 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950) and
27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953).
The first American court of last resort to hold, in the absence
of statute, that a child who survives birth can bring an action for
injuries incurred before birth was the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Wlliams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d
334 (1949). The child's mother fell from the steps of D's vehicle
as a result of D's negligence. At the time of -thefall, the child was
unborn and viable. The court held that an unborn viable child is a
"person" within the constitutional provision granting every person a
remedy for injury to his person. The court said that to hold otherwise would deprive the infant of the right conferred by the state
constitution upon all persons. The decision in the Williams case
apparently overruled Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio
App. 1943).
The arguments generally advanced in favor of allowing recovery,
at least where the alleged injuries occurred when the child was viable,
are as follows: (1) an unborn viable child is capable of independent
existence: hence it should be regarded as a separate entity, Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra; (2) the law -recognizes an unborn child sufficiently to protect its property rights and rights of
inheritance, and protects it against the crimes of others: therefore
it should recognize its separate existence for the purpose of redressing
torts, Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940);
(3) if no right of action is allowed, there is a wrong inflicted for
which there is no remedy, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946); (4) absence of precedent is no ground for denying recovery
where a wrong has been committed, Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra.
Since the holding by the Ohio courti the Williams case, numerous jurisdictions, including New York, Missouri, and Illinois,
all of which reversed prior decisions, 'have favored the view allowing
the child's right of recovery. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953)
and supplement citations. Even Massachusetts, in its most recent
case on the question, permitted recovery to a viable child. Keyes v.
Construction Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960). The court
said that there is no need to reverse the Dietrich decision, supra,
which doubtless was right when rendered, but in view of modern precedent, its application should be limited to cases where the facts are
essentially the same.
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In most of the jurisdictions in which recovery has been granted
for prenatal injuries, two conditions appear to be essential: (1) the
infant must have been viable at the time of the negligent act; and
(2) it must have been born alive. Tursi v. New England Windsor Co.,
19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955); Amann v. Faidy, 415
Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). However, the New Hampshire
court in two recent cases, Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147
A.2d 108 (1958) and Poliquin v. Macdonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957), seems to take the view that if either of the two
above conditions is -present, recovery will be granted. In the Bennett
case the court held that -an infant born alive can maintain an action
to recover ,forprenatal injuries inflicted upon it by the tort of another,
even if it had not reached the state of a viable foetus at the time of
the injury. Accord, Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960). On the other hand, in the Poliquin case the court said that
a foetus having reached hat period of prenatal maturity where it is
capable of independent life is a person, and if such child dies in the
womb as a result of another's negligence, an action of recovery may
be maintained in its 'behalf. Accord, Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955).
Thus, the courts are taking the more liberal view, and are allowing recovery for prenatal injuries. Most courts hold that the child
must have been viable and born alive before recovery can be granted.
Some courts 'hold -that the child need not have been viable so long
as it was born alive. A few courts permit recovery even where the
child is 'born dead, provided it was viable when the injury occurred.
The only other possibility, for which no authority has 'been found, is
where the child was neither viable at the time of injury nor born alive.
Nick George Zegrea

Wills--Subsequent Will Containing Express Clause
of Revocation-Time Revocation Takes Effect
TestatLrix executed two wills, the first in 1954 and the second
in 1955. The later will contained a revocation clause which expressly
revoked all wills previously made. Both wills were left in the custody
of a bank. In 1956 testatrix withdrew the 1955 will stating that she
wished -to make a new will. The new will was never made and the
1955 will was never found, and so was presumptively destroyed
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